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W.K. Clifford’s famous 1876 essay The Ethics of Belief contains one of the most 
memorable lines in the history of philosophy: “it is wrong always, everywhere, and 
for anyone, to believe anything upon insufficient evidence.” The challenge to 
religious belief stemming from this moralized version of evidentialism is still widely 
discussed today. 
 
W.K. Clifford (1845-1879) was a British mathematician, philosopher, and public intellectual, most 
famous for his widely anthologized essay The Ethics of Belief. Originally addressed to the 
Metaphysical Society in 1876, the essay contains one of the most memorable lines in the history of 
philosophy: “it is wrong always, everywhere, and for anyone, to believe anything upon insufficient 
evidence.” This is a moralized version of what is known in epistemology as evidentialism. Clifford 
was educated at Trinity College, Cambridge, he taught at University College, London, he was a 
Fellow of the Royal Society, and he died of tuberculosis at the young age of 33. 
 
Clifford was the youngest member ever elected to the Metaphysical Society, which was founded for 
the purpose of addressing a cultural crisis. Due to academic developments in Biblical criticism, the 
publication of Charles Darwin’s work, and the influence of Herbert Spencer’s philosophy, many 
Victorians thought the grounds beneath religious and moral institutions were eroding away. In his 
celebrated lectures and publications, Clifford addressed himself to this very crisis and was 
enthusiastic about three central claims: (i) his aforementioned endorsement of evidentialism on moral 
grounds; (ii) the challenge he thought evidentialism posed to religious belief of any kind; and (iii) the 
appropriateness of the scientific method as an alternative guide to social progress and moral truth. 
 
In his famous 1876 address (published in 1877), Clifford focuses on the direct and indirect negative 
consequences of ungrounded beliefs—beliefs that are not based on the available evidence—and on 
our moral duty to prevent them. Such consequences include: (a) the prevention of diligent inquiry in 
the future, by virtue of having begun a habit of careless belief-formation; (b) the promotion of further 
ungrounded beliefs, since any further belief grounded on an ungrounded belief will be ungrounded as 
well; (c) the inevitable loss of honor once those beliefs lead to action, for one commits a “sin against 
mankind” if one inflicts on others the risks resulting from ungrounded belief; (d) the social damage 
caused by false beliefs, which are propagated by believing on insufficient evidence; (e) the poisoning 
of humanity’s intellectual “common property,” which was entrusted to us by the previous generation; 
and (f) the production of people much more willing to deceive, since forming ungrounded beliefs is a 
clear sign to others that I myself do not care about the truth. Because of such inescapable negative 
consequences, Clifford takes it that we have moral duty to believe in accordance with our evidence. 
With this duty as his background, Clifford then outlines conditions for accepting testimony and for 
making inferences that go beyond our own experiences in a thinly veiled critique of religious beliefs. 
 
Despite its historical pedigree and influence, however, some philosophers working on the 
epistemology of religion have pushed back against Clifford’s evidentialism. Willian James, for 
example, is the author of what is perhaps the most influential counter-piece to Clifford’s famous 
address. According to James (1896), Clifford simply ignores the amount of non-evidential factors 
that determine what we take as our evidence and what we take as good enough of it. For James, these 
are psychological factors owing to our “passional tendencies and volitions”. James also argues that 
on matters of great importance that remain undecided by the evidence—religious matters in 
particular—there is nothing about our evidence that can dictate which of the twin goals of belief-
formation we must prioritize: believing what is true or not believing what is false. In these two ways, 
James attempts to expose Clifford’s ascetic evidentialism as just one amongst many policies of 
belief-formation from which we may “lawfully” choose.  
 
Today, even some who share Clifford’s evidentialism have nonetheless been critical of his appeal to 
morality as its justifying grounds. The worry is that some simple counter-examples seem to reveal 
morally innocent ungrounded beliefs. Richard Feldman (2006) has argued that such counterexamples 
arise in cases where believing against the evidence is life-saving and nothing else seems to hang in 
the balance. Perhaps a patient in critical care will increase her chances of survival by a non-trivial 
degree if she believes, against the evidence, that she is very likely to recover. Susan Haack (2001) 
has also argued that sometimes believing against the evidence is simply trivial and isolated. Perhaps 
a certain shopper quite uncritically believes, against the evidence, that the apples she just picked are 
the best apples in the supermarket. For these contemporary “Cliffordians”, therefore, a proper 
defense of evidentialism requires a focus on the “epistemic point of view” as a distinct normative 
domain from the “practical point of view”. Yet Clifford’s sense of a moral duty to believe the truth is 
not a relic of epistemology’s past. Stephen Grimm (2009), for example, follows Clifford in claiming 
that we have a moral duty “not to be cavalier when we form beliefs” since we are potential sources of 
information on every subject matter to others who might care about it a great deal. 
 
I myself have been critical of evidentialism, of Clifford, and of Cliffordians (cf. Oliveira 2017 and 
forthcoming). Nonetheless, my respect for Clifford’s work and ideas has never wavered. By all 
contemporaneous accounts, Clifford was a man of great intelligence, wit, and social grace. His 
lectures and essays were well received in his time, and the best of these are still well regarded and 
much discussed today. 
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